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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ and political participation at the city-region level, alongside the distributional struggles within city-regions which shape city-regional institutions and politics. Only by doing this, it is argued, can we come to understand "the contested role of city-regions" and as a consequence better "theorize capital-state-space relations" (Jonas 2011, p. 6) .
Notwithstanding the fact that each geopolitical project is specific to the national context within which it is located, this paper focuses on recent developments in England to enunciate further the geopolitical construction of city-regions. England is a vivacious setting within which to pursue city-regional research owing to the smorgasbord of initiatives, policies, strategies and institutional frameworks which have been summoned up by policy elites in recent years to operate across a, variously defined, city-regional scale (Harrison, 2010b) . This hive of city-regional activity is symptomatic of how devising new -generally accepted to mean more flexible, networked, and responsive -forms of planning and governance at the scale of city-regions has ascended to become an officially institutionalised task for political strategists and policy elites the world over (OECD, 2007) . Yet for all of the international support, fervent posturing and triumphalism being marshalled by those advocating city-regions as the "ideal scale for policy intervention in a globalized world" (Rodríguez-Pose, 2008 , p. 1029 , critics ultimately believe a 'thin' approach is being adopted (Harrison, 2007; Jonas and Ward, 2007) . In England, for example, the lack of a coherent master plan has resulted in a set of "reactionary and incremental adjustments that lack strategic direction, buy-in and focus" (Ayres and Stafford, 2009, p.619) . Stated more bluntly, initiatives branded as city-regional have produced nothing more than a patchwork quilt of assorted, weak, and often contradictory and overlapping initiatives that have failed to live up to expectation. Nonetheless, a decade on the enduring appeal of city-regions remains undiminished among policy elites. England is divided into a mosaic of 39 subnational units (LEPs), each bearing some, little, or no resemblance to city-regions. Yet despite the change in political orientation at the centre of UK politics, there is little chance to celebrate. Early indications suggest only minimal change to the trajectory or fabric of the city-regionalism project in England:
"[Despite being] launched with similar 'can-do' business and community empowerment bravado, LEPs are likely to fail. Their modus operandi involves rolling forward existing centrally-orchestrated policy regimes, deploying limited levers and mechanisms to influence the business community, and ultimately being unable to correct deep-rooted market failures." (Jones and Jessop, 2010, p. 1144 emphasis added) So despite the allure of city-regionalism as a geopolitical project in England, as elsewhere, there remains limited hope that it will achieve the ambitious goals -growth and competitiveness, meaningful economic prosperity, expected affluence, ability to tackle entrenched inequalities, scope to encourage smart planning, enable piecemeal democratic rights -that its academic and non-academic architects and proponents purport i .
Launched in 2008, the Atlantic Gateway Strategy (AGS) provides a radical alternative to the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberal state spatial restructuring and governmentalised remappings of state space which have characterised previous, and indeed current, city-region initiatives in the UK. The brainchild of Peel Holdings, a private investment company, the AGS is a bold and unique vision which aims to establish Liverpool-Manchester as a globally competitive urban area. Encompassing a population of 6 million and an economy worth upwards of £50 billion (Gross Value Added) per annum, the Atlantic Gateway is England's largest economic metropolitan area outside London and has the critical mass necessary to (at least) be considered a 'global' city-region (Scott, 2001 ). Yet it remains one of the most socially and economically polarised. Four of the seven districts with the highest local concentration of deprivation in England (eight out of the top ten if you include areas within 20 miles of the Atlantic Gateway) and three of the four districts with the highest overall levels of deprivation are contained within it (CLG, 2011a) .
In an era of state under-provision -certainly relative to the investment in infrastructure and state subsidy that once characterised the Fordist-Keynesian State -the Atlantic Gateway represents an important window onto what may ultimately turn out to be the next stage of city-regionalism as a geopolitical project (cf. Jonas, 2012) . To develop this argument, the paper begins by situating the AGS within the broader framework of how cityregionalism has emerged as a geopolitical project in England. This is important because it shows how the AGS is unusual in its genesis occurred outside the formal structures of the state -what we might conceive to be a new non-state spatial strategy (cf. Brenner, 2004) .
More substantively it goes on to raise important questions about the changing nature of the state, in particular the role of the state in regulating local and regional development when key assets (e.g. land, infrastructure) and contracts for service delivery previously the preserve of government (e.g. health, education, local government) are owned increasingly by non-state private industry actors. Rethinking city-regionalism along these lines, Section 3 draws on Cox's (1998) distinction between spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement to analyse the motivation and rationale for Peel constructing the Atlantic Gateway spatial concept, before Section 4 reveals how and why they Peel are invoking the city-region concept and the tensions which currently surround the Atlantic Gateway initiative as Peel seek to defend and enhance their interests in the region. The final section concludes with some broader reflections on what an analysis of the Atlantic Gateway initiative can contribute to our understandings of city-regionalism as a geopolitical project of late-capitalism, and the production of new non-state spatial strategies more generally.
CITY-REGIONALISM: ENGLAND'S MAGIC BULLET?
It is now over ten years since Is There a 'Missing Middle' in (CLG, 2010) ii .
Alongside the global appeal to city-regions (see Herrschel, 2012; Segbers, 2007; Vogel et al., 2010; Xu and Yeh, 2010) (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009; Harrison and Growe, 2012; Heley, 2012 Nevertheless, while it is widely accepted that England is seeking greater engagement with city-regionalism as a geopolitical project, contradictions exist in policies aimed at increasing the institutional capacity of city-regions. The first of these is the geography of city-regionalism. Various empirical studies suggest that city-regions, as politically constructed, do not conform to mappings of the new urban economy which map cityregions according to labour market analysis, travel-to-work areas, and so on (Harrison, 2010a ). The second is mission creep. This has seen policies launched as 'city-regional' become wider in scope as elected politicians open them up to all areas (those excluded or are on the fringes of city-regionalism) by framing them as 'sub-regional' (Harrison, 2010b) .
Third is the ambivalence of the central state. Evident from points one and two, that city- Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, most proposals were "hopelessly fragmented" (quoted in Carpenter, 2010) . Fragmentation was also a theme picked up recently by Pain (2011a) in her analysis of England's primary functional economy -the London (mega) city-region -where she argues governance will now be considerably 'weaker' and fragmented with now 12 LEPs operating across this area rather than the three sets of regional institutions in the period of regionalism which preceded it.
General ambivalence is also evident. A report produced by the consultants SQW (2010, p. 6) claimed business involvement in preparing bids was "in general, thin" and "unsurprising given the difficulty of marshalling the business community to engage in a process that -from their perspective -could have seemed abstract and of no immediate consequence". Added to this, the UK Government has been slow to resource LEPs.
Nonetheless, the fact there is now 39 LEPs, covering all but one local authority in England, suggests there has not been complete ambivalence. But this overlooks one key factor. LEPs are the Coalition Government's preferred model for the governance of subnational economic development, which for want of a better description means they are the 'only show in town'. To put it simply, there is nothing much that is new in the proposals for LEPs that was not on offer to local areas through previous initiatives (e.g. Multi-Area Agreements), but where there was limited take-up of the opportunities to work across this geography when offered under voluntary conditions by the previous Labour Government, the Coalition Government's abolition of the regional tier of governance and the loss of resource for subnational economic development this brought about, left areas with little option but to engage. Although never presented as such, this obligation and the fact the Government retained the power to decide which LEPs were approved ensured this exercise had all the hallmarks of neoliberal state spatial restructuring through a new governmentalised remapping of state space. It is hardly surprising that many commentators have been quick to suggest LEPs are 'destined for oblivion' (Walker, 2012) .
What makes the Atlantic Gateway initiative stand out is that on first viewing it is not many of the things outlined above: (1) the contrivance of private investors the Atlantic Gateway is not centrally orchestrated by the state but genuinely business-led -a new nonstate spatial strategy in the making; (2) covering an area of 6 million residents and an economy worth £50bn per annum it has the critical mass to be an agglomeration economy à la Scott's (2001) notion of the global city-region; (3) it does not map onto known political or administrative units but has fuzzy boundaries; (4) it offers something distinctly 'new', that is, it is not a scalar amplification or contraction of previous entities; (5) the promise of a £50
billion investment also suggests it is well-resourced; and (6) contra the fragmentation of governance arrangements across England's largest urban economic regions with the establishment of LEPs it seeks to provide a single governance arrangement to work across England's second largest economic urban region.
In this way the Atlantic Gateway Strategy presents an alternative vision of cityregionalism as a geo-political project. Yet it also poses a series of searching questions about what an alternative city-regionalism might amount to, not least of which is the motivation for private investors such as Peel to now embark on such an initiative. It is to these questions the paper now turns.
INTRODUCING ATLANTIC GATEWAY: THE 'THAMES GATEWAY OF THE NORTH'
The Atlantic Gateway is the result of 25 years investment in infrastructure, transport and from low-carbon energy sources, enough to power 3 million homes (more than the number in the Atlantic Gateway). Peel's latest initiative is its proposed £50 billion co-ordinated cross-sector investment strategy known as the Atlantic Gateway.
Peel's Vision: company vision becomes spatial vision
The Atlantic Gateway concept was first launched on 5 September 2008, albeit at inception it was referred to as 'Ocean Gateway'. In both its original and later guises, Ocean Gateway and Atlantic Gateway present Peel's vision for raising the international profile of the LiverpoolManchester urban corridor and capitalising on its economic potential as a "global growth opportunity" to become a "globally competitive urban area" (Peel, 2010a, p. 2 Cox's (1998) erudite conceptualisation of the distinction between 'spaces of dependence' and 'spaces of engagement', its connection to the politics of scale and the search for local urban politics -a problem recently revisited by Cox in the context of metropolitan governance (Cox, 2010; .
While it is now some time since Cox first made this distinction, his heuristic remains one of the most powerful explanatory tools available for conceptualising the political construction of spatial scales, and it is worth quoting at length:
"Spaces of dependence are defined by those more-or-less localized social relations upon which we depend for the realization of essential interests and for which there are no substitutes elsewhere; they define place-specific conditions for our material well being and our sense of significance. These spaces are inserted in broader sets of relationships of a more global character and these constantly threaten to undermine or dissolve them. People, firms, state agencies, etc., organize in order to secure the conditions for the continued existence of their spaces of dependence but in so doing have to engage with other centers of social power: local government, the national press, perhaps the international press, for example. In so doing they construct a different form of space which I call here a space of engagement: the space in which the politics of securing a space of dependence unfolds." (Cox, 1998, projects to be realised.
Part and parcel of this, it must be remembered, is that Peel's ambitious plans for further expansion are all subject to planning approval -and this is the fourth point. At the launch of Ocean Gateway, John Whittaker made it abundantly clear in a speech to gathered delegates that Peel was pushing for a special planning regime in order to streamline the planning permission process:
"Ocean Gateway should have its own planning regime led by the regional development agency and the local authorities so we can overcome individual authority objections." (Quoted in Barry, 2008) Framed very much in the context of enabling Peel (and other investors) to accelerate the delivery of major infrastructure projects and job creation initiatives for the areas represented by the gathered delegates, it did not escape the attention of those present that this was to the explicit benefit of Peel's corporate expansionist plans.
And finally fifth, it would be wrong not to mention the loss of state subsidy to the Gateway region resulting from a major reduction in European Regional Development Fund monies (due to the accession of Eastern European countries to the EU), the 2008 economic crisis, and the 2012 abolition of Regional Development Agencies -although the latter both came after Peel launched Ocean Gateway. This was very much the key theme emerging from the NWDA (2010b) press release that announced the launch of the Atlantic (Ocean)
Gateway:
"We all know the public purse is going to be constrained -it will be private investment which will characterise the next decade." Steven Broomhead, Chief Executive, Northwest Regional Development Agency "This framework ... reflects the changing role of the public sector" Cllr John Merry, Leader of Salford City Council (and NWDA Board Member) What is particularly pertinent about these two quotes is the suggestion of a broader transition, one which opens up the possibility that initiatives such as Atlantic (Ocean)
Gateway will become common place -perhaps even indicative of a second stage of city- To understand why the AGS geography became compromised in this way we need once again to reflect on the unfolding politics of Peel's endeavour to construct their space of engagement. The first point to emphasise is that Peel's major ally, the NWDA, was itself a key advocate of focusing attention on city-regions. When in 2004, the NWDA -along with their North East and Yorkshire & Humberside counterparts -were placed in charge of The Northern Way growth strategy by the UK Government, the first thing they did was to convert the strategy from one based on growth corridors (one of which incidentally had Liverpool-Manchester as part of it) to one focused on city-regions. Part and parcel of reconfiguring the Northern Way was the NWDAs decision to designate three city-regions (Liverpool, Manchester and Central Lancashire), a process which was to give future regional spatial strategy making a demonstrable city-region twist in the North West (Harrison, 2010a) .
In this way, we can see that for the NWDA to endorse Peel's vision in their Regional Strategy then they would have to do like-wise -a point emphasised in the draft Regional Strategy which outlined the first three strategic spatial priorities for the North West as (1) Manchester City Region, (2) Liverpool City Region, and (3) Atlantic Gateway (NWDA, 2010a) .
Alongside this, a second point worth emphasising is how the in the process of preparing the new Regional Strategy the NWDA appointed SQW consultants to conduct a study and stakeholder consultation into the existence of a Manchester-Liverpool corridor. SQW (2009, p. 24) reported back that "there is no tangible integrated growth corridor between the two core cities in the North West region" and stakeholders "did not recognise Atlantic Gateway as a geography". Despite their contention that 'Ocean Gateway is a reality' (Peel, 2012 ) the need for Peel to revisit the urban corridor concept in order secure the support of NWDA is clear to see.
A third point is that not only did Peel have to engage with the NWDA, they also had to engage and secure the support of the city-regions themselves. In the case of Liverpool this was less problematic, in part because more of Peel's 50 projects are located within their city-region but also, as Pemberton and Lloyd (2011, p. 508) What we see in the case of Atlantic Gateway then is strong parallels with classic accounts of the 'new urban politics' (Cox, 1993) , in particular the different forms urban regimes take depending on the structural power of business and the changing nature of the local political environment. Peel's initial attempt to 'bargain out' (Stone, 1989; Kantor et al., 1997 ) the terms of cooperation for a new metropolitan governing coalition, principally though not exclusively with the NWDA, saw them use their bargaining resources and the opportunities afforded by an increasingly dependent-public sector to create a political alliance, align strategic priorities, and achieve the political power to give the regime "power to" (Stone, 1989) or the capacity to act in achieving economic goals set to meet the shared political and corporate interests of the regional state and Peel. Clear to see is how the distribution of bargaining advantages that structure encounters between the public-and private-sector players operating in and across the Atlantic Gateway geography have altered, a cause and effect of the need to constantly renegotiate the terms of cooperation within the regime in light of the changing political and economic conditions and their determinant impact on 'regime' politics.
Signifying the extent to which Peel seem prepared to go to secure Manchester's support, and their space of dependence, Peel inserted "Accelerating Growth across the Manchester and Liverpool City Regions" into the title of the AGS, responded to many of the criticisms levelled at them by the City Council Executive, and listed the primary objective as being "to support and accelerate Manchester and Liverpool city regions' growth strategies" (Peel, 2010a, p. 4 ). Yet for all Peel's endeavour in securing the support of key stakeholders things began to unravel soon after the AGS was officially launched amid much fanfare on 16
March 2010.
Peel's Capacity -Losing its Main Ally
On 22 "private-led special purposes LEP" (Peel, 2010b, p. ii Manchester City Council (2010b, p. 7) was also quick to affirm that:
"The [Manchester City Council] Executive has a clearly established policy position where the Atlantic Gateway is concerned; this is not a functioning economic area and while there are some proposals contained within it which are likely to have merit and support at least in principle, there are other aspects of the proposals which cannot be supported given the potential to distort established sub-regional priorities."
A regional Leaders Forum was hastily convened for 7 September, the day after the deadline for bids to Government, to discuss Peel's LEP proposal. The next day it was widely reported that Peel had withdrawn their LEP proposal, yet what was to emerge in the days that followed was Peel had secured approval to pursue the creation of a specialist delivery vehicle which would be loosely accountable to the three LEPs (if approved by Government)
29 | P a g e and lead to the formation of a new public-private governing coalition. The upshot of this is that Peel had successfully negotiated a new position for the Atlantic Gateway, albeit one which is ultimately much weaker than it would have been had they been successful in Raco's (2012) foray into the role of contracts and the privatisation of local democracy is proving particularly revealing in eliciting fresh insights into a world whereby urban-economic infrastructure, and by implication metropolitan regions, are becoming a key regulatory and investment space which private industry seeks increasingly to control, manage and extract value from.
What this paper has revealed, however, is that in revisiting Cox's (1998) Gateway framework (their space of engagement) was initially constructed in a way that served to ensure Peel's corporate interests (their space of dependence) were defended and enhanced as a result. Not dissimilar to how city-regionalism as a governmentalised remapping of state space is part of the state's spatial strategy to maintain its legitimacy for managing and regulating the economy, we can see how this alternative vision of cityregionalism as a geopolitical project is similarly constructed (that is, defined, delimited, and designated) to benefit its architects.
But as noted, in the case of Peel city-regionalism was only engaged with reluctantly.
It was only the necessity for Peel to engage with other centres of social power to construct their space of engagement that the Atlantic Gateway concept became city-regional in its focus and construction. What this alerts us to then is the role of inherited landscapes of state scalar organisation and the realisation that even when constructed outside the state, economic development and investment strategies such as Peel's Atlantic Gateway have to engage with institutions of the state in order to construct their space of engagement, and secure their space of dependence. Given inherited structures of state scalar organisation continue to ensure there is no blank landscape for new spatial strategies (even those constructed outside of state control) the state continues to enact a key role in orchestrating economic development. Yet perhaps the question which arises from the experience of Peel's attempt to construct the Atlantic Gateway is for how long the state will be able to maintain this degree of control in an era where state under-provision of investment in urban economic infrastructure behoves institutions of the state to become ever more reliant on private investment groups to deliver the jobs, growth and regeneration of the future.
